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ABSTRACT
The Weberian bureaucracy argument emphasizes a public administration with a set of principles on
how it is organised, to make the bureaucracy more productive. This in turn means a more productive
public sector. Due to the interconnected nature of the public and private sectors, improved public sector
productivity also improves private sector productivity. Both the public and private sector productivities
make up an economy's overall macroeconomic productivity. The result is enhanced economic growth.
Based on this theoretical claim and using prior studies on the relevance of Weberianess as benchmarks,
this paper tried to explore the relationship between Weberianess and productivity, at macroeconomic
cross-country level. Studies that have so far explored the relevance of the Weberian model for
productivity, have focused on specific country cases. The two bureaucratic organisational structures
examined were bureaucratic professionalism and bureaucratic closedness, while the two
macroeconomic productivity measures explored were Total Factor Productivity (TFP) and Average
Productivity – AP (measured as GDP per person employed), for the year 2014. Two Quality of
Government (QoG) datasets and one World Bank (WB) dataset were used. The sample sizes included
both the more developed and the lesser developed nations. Empirically, bureaucratic professionalism
showed a positive correlation with both TFP and AP. Bureaucratic closedness, however, was
statistically insignificant for both TFP and AP, when measured as both a full index and using its
different components. These results indicate that some Weberian principles are still relevant today. One
policy recommendation is that states should ensure high professionalism in bureaucratic structures, so
that macroeconomic productivity is heightened, as this affects long-run sustainable economic growth.
Keywords: Economic Growth, Productivity, Total Factor Productivity (TFP), Average Productivity
(AP), Public Administration Institutions, Weberianess, Professionalism, Closedness.
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CHAPTER 1
1.1 INTRODUCTION
Economic growth, being a concept that is easy to both quantify and measure (Feldman et al, 2016), has
facilitated many empirical researches that have led to the sprouting of exogenous and endogenous
growth models (Dutt & Ros, 2008; Peet & Hartwick, 2009; Szirmai, 2015). The former focus on
international systematic factors, like international treaties, while the latter focus on in-country features
as being the main drivers of economic growth (de Le Fuente, 2000; Parker, 2012). It is, however,
apparent that many of the very renowned endogenous growth models focusing on in-country features
such as 'institutions' centre on either institutions of property rights (Neo-Institutionalist theory) or
technological institutions (Neo-Schumpeterian theory), than on institutions of public administration.1
Early scholars like Max Weber emphasized a public administration with a set of principles such as
meritocratic hiring and predictable long term careers (Dahlström, Lapuente & Teorell, 2010). These
principles, if strictly adhered to, were to make bureaucracies well organised and more productive, for
the effective provision of public goods and services (Ezrow et al, 2015). Based on Max's 'Weberian'
concept, early attempts to address the gap in endogenous growth models were evident in the work of
Evans & Rauch (1999) who found a positive correlation between Weberianess and economic growth.
Over the decades, others have sort to verify the relevance of the Weberian model, using diverse
empirical approaches. One thing is clear: there are contradictory views on the relevance of the
Weberian model (Lovett, 2011: 24). Some recent studies, like that of Lee & Ki (2017), have concluded
that Weberianess no longer matters for economic activity. Others, like Kurtz & Schrank (2007), have
claimed the existence of reverse causality and have argued that Evans & Rauch's noticed positive
correlation could have been due to other economic growth determinants. However, others like
Nistotskaya & Cingolani (2016) have examined Weberianess against 'private sector performance
linked' economic growth determinants instead, and a positive correlation was noticed. Yet, among these
studies, few have focused on determinants that encompass both the public and private sectors, not only
private sector performance. Few have focused on determinants that also 'directly' capture public sector
productivity. Weberianess was to enhance 'both' public and private sector productivity, due to what
Jordaan (2013) observed as the inevitable interconnected roles of the public and private sectors. A
research gap thus lies in examining Weberianess against several 'productivity indicative' economic
growth determinants, capturing both private and public sector productivities, at cross-country level.
1 Examples of the vast array of Neo-Institutionalist theory writings include Acemoglu & Robinson (2008), Iyer (2010),
Dell (2010), and Michalopoulos & Papaioannou (2013). Examples of the vast array of Neo-Shumpeterian theory
writings include Romer (1990), Verspagen (1993) & (2009), and Aghion, Akcigit & Howitt (2013).
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This study, therefore, tried to explore the importance of Weberianess today using 'productivity
indicative' macroeconomic concepts of Total Factor Productivity (TFP) and Average Productivity
(AP), which capture both public and private sector productivities on one end, and are linked to
economic growth, on the other end. Accordingly, this research contributes to macroeconomics and
public administration literatures by attempting to verify the 'relevance' of Weberianess today for
macroeconomic productivity. This study also offered a shift of focus to the under-explored link of
productivity measures like TFP with bureaucratic organisational structures at cross country level.
Previous studies have focused on specific country cases. The research question posed was: 'To what
extent is macroeconomic productivity empirically linked to Weberian public administration structures
today?' The aim of this paper was, therefore, to explore the idea that how bureaucracies are structured
has a bearing on productivity - at macroeconomic level.
To answer the research question, this study used country level cross-sectional data from the Quality of
Government (QoG) and World Bank datasets. The datasets included both the more developed and the
lesser developed nations. The dependent variables used were macroeconomic TFP and GDP per person
employed (to represent AP), while the main independent variables were the bureaucratic
professionalism and bureaucratic closedness indices. As per the Weberian bureaucracy argument, it
was hypothesized that both bureaucratic professionalism and bureaucratic closedness would correlate
positively with TFP and AP. Empirically, bureaucratic closedness showed no statistical significance
with either AP (GDP per person employed) or TFP, using sample sizes of 41 and 40 countries,
respectively. Even when the N was increased to 101, 114 and 116, while focusing on the three different
components that made up the Closedness Index, each of the components showed statistical
insignificance. Bureaucratic professionalism, however, showed a positive correlation with both AP and
TFP, using sample sizes of 100 and 86 countries, respectively. Even when heterogeneity was controlled
for, and the Ns slightly dropped, the results remained the same for both professionalism and closedness.
This suggests that there are some Weberian principles that still matter for a country's economic activity.
In terms of paper structure, this paper is arranged into four chapters. Chapter 1 provides the
introduction. Chapter 2 firstly gives the theoretical framework and then highlights key empirical
research on the relevance of Weberianess, and the research gap noticed. Chapter 3 has the research aim
and hypotheses, followed by a comprehensive discussion of the operationalisation of concepts and
measurement. Chapter 4 has the data diagnostics, results analysis, results discussion and conclusion.
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CHAPTER 2
This chapter is the literature review. It starts off by firstly defining the key concept of productivity
before providing the theory on which the principles guiding this research rest. This is then followed by
a review of relevant empirical studies, which highlight the research gap. A succinct summary is given
at the end of the chapter.
2.1 DEFINITION OF PRODUCTIVITY
Before discussing a theory that boarders on improving productivity, it is important that the term
productivity is defined, so that how it is used in this research is made clear. Productivity refers to the
ratio of inputs to outputs (Inklaar & Timmer, 2013; Da Cruz & Marques, 2011). In economic theory,
the two types of productivity include partial productivity and Total Factor Productivity (TFP)
(Mojtahedzadeh & Keshideh, 2015). Partial productivity looks at individual inputs used in the
production process, and is therefore the output “per unit of a specific factor of production” (Khan,
2006: 1954). An example of partial productivity is labour productivity (also known as Average
Productivity - AP), which reflects the capacity of each worker or the degree of intensity of each
worker's efforts (OECD, 2018a). TFP, in contrast, looks at both the inherent productivity and aggregate
efficiency of all factors of production (Jones & Tarp, 2017). TFP thus also captures partial productivity.
Productivity is the portion of outputs produced that is not explained by the increase in inputs consumed
(Da Cruz & Marques, 2011; Comin, 2006), but the degree of intensity and efficiency of the use of the
already existing inputs (Comin, 2006). Increases in economic output is the two-way interaction of
increases in inputs used in the production process and/or the productivity increases in the use of these
inputs (Mojtahedzadeh & Keshideh, 2015). Therefore, productivity is key in understanding economic
growth differences (Hall and Jones, 1999; Altuğ & Fİlİztekİn, 2006; Danquah, Moral-Benito &
Ouattara, 2011; Brasch, 2015; Wu, 2016; OECD, 2015 and 2017).
2.2 THE ORGANISATIONAL THEORY OF BUREAUCRACY
The organisational theory of bureaucracy originates from Max Weber, who saw bureaucracies as a
form of organisational structure that assured public sector rationality (Udy, 1959; Altay, 1999; Turner,
2006). This was because public administration institutions ensured the coherent execution of state law
through state ministries and bureaucratic agencies (Woodrow, 1887; Uwizeyimana, 2013; Ezrow et al,
2015). Public administration institutions are the channels for the bureaucratic (or administrative)
organisation of government (Marume, 2016: 16), so Max Weber saw them as relevant for economic
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activity (Evans & Rauch, 1999; Szirmai, 2011: 76). Before Weber, bureaucracy was in the broad sense
seen only as a collection of state officials (Turner, 2006). Yet, bureaucracy in the Weberian sense
referred to well organised institutions of public administration (Ezrow et al, 2015).2 Weber came up
with the 'Weberian bureaucracy' argument, which according to Dahlström, Lapuente & Teorell (2010)
and Ezrow et al (2015) emphasized that a well organised bureaucratic structure had a set of principles
such as hiring based on technical expertise, formal examinations, predictable long-term careers, rule-
based authority, the internal recruitment of senior officials and hierarchical organisation. These
principles all fell into the four categories of standardisation, formalisation, differentiation, and
decentralisation (Walton, 2005). Others like Dahlström et al (2015) have categorised principles like
long term careers and formal examinations, among others, as bureaucratic closedness (i.e. being more
public-like) and principles like hiring based on technical expertise, among others, as bureaucratic
professionalism (i.e. being more professional than politicised).
According to Weber (1946), Blau and Scott (1962) and Hage (1965), standardised procedures and rules
provided the necessary guidelines for employees' performance and coordination of both interdependent
and differentiated activities (Walton, 2005: 573). Strict bureaucratic administration would lead to
bureaucracies achieving optimal levels of speed, precision and reduction of costs while ensuring the
non-ambiguity of work tasks (Matte, 2016: 5). Also, unique employee experience was readily available
because it was documented and filed (Walton, 2005). To ensure transparent, objective and predictable
behaviour, the bureaucrats were to be professionals that were hired on grounds of technical merit, not
loyalty, clan, political affiliation or special entitlements (Ezrow et al, 2015; Matevosya 2015).
Meritocracy during hiring meant the emphasis on education and IQ testing through job entrance
examinations (Evans & Rauch, 1999). This meant that an economy was now managed by technocrats
who were ‘fitted’ to properly navigate organisational change (Matevosya 2015: 1). Meritocracy thus
facilitated the effective negation of the role of a bureaucrat (Greisman & Ritzer, 1981: 34). 
In addition, states were to offer apposite compensation such as long term careers and competitive
salaries (Ezrow et al, 2015). This established consistent organisational norms, reduced the temptation
for one to engage in corruption, and ensured the retention of highly competent employees (Ibid). It also
increased corporate coherence because bureaucrats could now pursue long-term goals effectively
(Evans & Rauch, 1999: 152). This made the professionals happier and more productive (Turner, 2017) –
2 The description of bureaucracy (i.e. it being a composition of bureaucrats), however, should not be mixed with its
evaluation (i.e. whether it is well organised or not, which others refer to as 'high' or 'low' quality) (Altay, 1999: 35).
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thereby offering both long-term tangible and intangible benefits (Evans & Rauch, 1999: 751). In
converse, since a government regulates economic activity, highly politicised bureaucracies, for
instance, meant that economic activity was run by politicians who could channel national resources
towards selfish interests (Nistotskaya & Cingolani, 2016). An unstable working environment is created
because concerns of loyalty dominate and political appointees make decisions that are favourable for
them in the short-term, before the next elections (Gandhi & Ruiz-Rufino: 228). This rent seeking
behaviour lowers the economic efficiency of public goods provision and leads to an ignoring of the
growth of an economy (Altay, 1999:42; Knott & Miller, 2008).
Bureaucratic organisation is important for an economy (Evans & Rauch, 1999), since how a state
contributes to economic activity largely depends on how productive that state is -i.e. it depends on that
state's 'own ability' to deliver public goods (Lovett, 2011). Bureaucracies facilitate public resource
allocation through the budgetary provision of services and goods to citizens (Altay, 1999: 36). Public
administration institutions thus have the task of ensuring that the resources allotted to public service
provision/ production are put to the best available use, to facilitate both greater and high quality output
in both the public and private sectors (Altay, 1999: 47; Matte, 2016: 1-2). Bureaucracies are channels
for producing a range of outputs -such as policies, regulations and infrastructure- that can boost an
economy's business environment (Asian Development Bank, 2007). For instance, when a government
provides good roads, the costs incurred in transporting goods is lowered (Martin & Anderson, 2005: 5-
6). Bureaucratic performance thus affects the level of market transaction costs which economic actors
use to calculate the risks in market profit-making opportunities (Nee & Opper, 2009: 9). Further,
regulations set entry and exit barriers in markets (Lovett, 2011), which either inhibit or stimulate
private sector investment (Ibid; Nistotskaya, Charron, & Lapuente, 2014). State activities are, therefore,
designed to increase productivity in the entire market/ production sector (Martin & Anderson, 2005).
From the preceding discussion, as postulated by the organisational theory of bureaucracy, a graphical
summary of the relevance of Weberian principles for productivity is as shown in Figure 1 on the next
page. In Figure 1, in a nutshell, Weber hypothesized an economy were the adherence to certain
principles (weberian principles) in public administration institutions would improve public sector
productivity. This then improves private sector productivity. Both the private and public sectors'
'improved' productivities equate to overall macroeconomic productivity for an economy, and this
affects long-run sustainable economic growth. For details on how macroeconomic productivity
measures of TFP and AP exactly link with long-run sustainable economic growth, see Appendix 1.
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Figure 1: Weberianess And Productivity
2.3 PREVIOUS RESEARCH
2.3.1 The Relevance of Weberianess
Early researchers like Northcote & Trevelyan (1853) hinted that an independent and meritocratic
bureaucracy acted as a channel for limiting corruption (Charron, Dahlström & Lapuente, 2016: 500).
However, in the 1970s and 80s, successive researches proved the existence of state corruption and rent-
seeking (Evans & Rauch, 1999). This triggered a rush to try and avoid these state 'evils', and the need
to look into exactly which state organisational structures were relevant for an economy was lost (Ibid).
Fortunately, in the late 1980s and the 1990s, researchers such as Stern (1989), Brautigam (1992),
Knack & Keefer (1995) and Mauro (1995) refocused on examining cross-national data demonstrating
the importance of state organisation, and underscored its relevance for an economy (Evans & Rauch,
1999; Kurtz & Schrank, 2007). By 1999, a key study was carried out by Evans & Rauch, and their
results suggested that countries whose public administration closely approximated Weber's
bureaucratic principles of organisation experienced higher economic growth (Evans & Rauch 1999:
749). Specifically, public administration institutions that had the two principles of meritocratic
recruitment and predictable long term rewarding careers correlated positively with economic growth,
especially for the lesser developed nations (Evans & Rauch, 1999).
After Evans & Rauch's study, other researchers sort to verify the relevance of Weberianess, using
diverse analytical methods. Henderson et al (2007), for instance, found a positive correlation between a
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state's ability to reduce poverty and Weberianess. Others like Tonon (2007) found that bureaucratic
professionalism and good governance, were positively linked.3 Later studies, however, have suggested
that certain Weberian principles might matter more for an economy than others. An example is
Dahlström, Lapuente & Teorell (2011: 656 & 664), who found that while meritocratic recruitment
reduced corruption (a growth inhibiting factor), other bureaucratic principles such as long term
rewarding careers and internal promotion did not significantly correlate with corruption. 
In contrast, Kurtz and Schrank (2007) suggested reverse causality for Weberianess and growth. Since
measures of public sector performance were opinion based, how efficient public institutions were was
'perceived' in the light of that country's economic performance (Ibid). Others like Han et al (2016)
reached similar conclusions. Further, economic growth determinants range from including both
physical and human capital to including regional, geographic and technological factors, demographics,
foreign direct investment (FDI), foreign aid, trade, and investment (Chirwa & Odhiambo, 2016).
Hence, Evans & Rauch's noticed positive correlation could have been due to other third factors, not
necessarily Weberianess (Kurtz & Schrank, 2007). Thus, others like Lovett (2011) sort to re-examine
these claims and found that Weberianess and growth proved to be inconclusive, but a strong correlation
was found between a country's level of development and Weberianess (Ibid). Lovett (2011), however,
also ran other tests and found that Weberianess still mattered but it seemed to matter less over time.
Recently, others have examined the relevance of Weberianess using economic growth determinants
instead, but with a focus on determinants that are closely tied to the private sector. Notable examples
included Nistotskaya, Charron & Lapuente (2015) who focused on SMEs, and Nistotskaya & Cingolani
(2016) who focused on regulatory quality and entrepreneurship. Both studies found that different
Weberian principles were positively correlated with the various 'private sector performance' measures.
This points to the authenticity of the idea that Weberianess is relevant for private sector productivity.
Further, others like Suzuki & Demircioglu (2017) focused on innovation and found similar results.
However, more recently, Lee & Ki (2017) sort to replicate Evans & Rauch's study. Lee & Ki (2017:
12) found both negative correlations and cases of no statistical significance for the two Weberian
principles of bureaucratic professionalism and bureaucratic closedness with economic growth and
concluded that Weberianess is no longer relevant. These findings, in contrast, put the relevance of the
Weberian model into question. There seems to be no consensus on the model's relevance today.
3 This justifies that the concept of good governance should not be confused with Weberianess, so that the two terms are
interchangeably used. Weberian principles may make up part of the way governance is tailored in a country. Governance
is a much broader concept. See, for instance, SIDA (2012).
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Furthermore, others have examined the Weberian model at microeconomic level. Haenisch (2012),
carried out an organisational level study on bureaucracies in the state of Wyoming in the USA and
proposed the discarding of bureaucracy if the performance of each worker was to improve. In the light
of Haenisch's thinking, according to Jacobsson et al (2015:8) and Walton (2005), today Weberian
ideals usually existing side-by-side with ideals about the state administration being responsive and
competitive, leading to flatter hierarchies and/or flexible work systems. However, others like Da Cruz
& Marques (2011) sort to examine the extent to which these hybrid/ 'innovation type' of bureaucracies
were more efficient than the traditional ones proposed by Weber. Da Cruz & Marques (2011) looked at
the institutional organisation of urban Portuguese municipal companies and their TFP. The 'hybrid'
bureaucracies were found to offer no improvements in urban public service provision mainly because
of the presence of political patronage and the lack of necessary technical competences (Ibid). The
'innovation type' municipal companies even exhibited lower TFP levels as compared to that exhibited
by the traditional ones (Ibid: 108). In contrast, Da Cruz & Marques' study underpinned the need to
explore Weberianess against different productivity indicative measures. Literature was scarcely found
on Weberianess and productivity indicative measures like TFP or AP at macroeconomic level.4
2.3.2 Why The Contradictory Empirical Results?
Walton (2005: 588) examined four decades of research and found that 50% of differences in empirical
research on the relevance of Weberianess was due to statistical artifacts. Studies that concluded that the
Weberian model had little or no relevance rested on illusionary variations which were instead due to
shortcomings in methodology, than theoretical or substantive issues (Ibid). Kurtz and Schrank's 2007
study, for instance, despite posing a seemingly strong critic, used a measurement that captured
'governance' and not 'public administration structures', making their reverse causality argument
misguided for the Weberian model.5 In addition, both Kurtz and Schrank (2007) and Lee & Ki (2017)
might have had their results affected by the tendency of economic growth to grow at a slower pace for
advanced economies – something actually noted by Kurtz & Schrank (2007). Furthermore, critics like
Haenisch (2012) did not clearly define bureaucracy and did not study other principles of the Weberian
bureaucracy model, such as bureaucratic professionalism.6 Examining Weberian bureaucracy in a
unidimensional way and generally applying the findings, seems problematic if the concept is not
accurately captured. Also, Haenisch (2012) did not capture actual changes in worker productivity.7
4 Many studies exist on TFP but with Weber's ideas on religion or migration, not bureaucratic structures. See for instance 
Cavalcanti et al (2007), Khan & Bashar (2008), and Nathan (2014). Studies on AP were scarcely found.
5 See Kurtz & Shrank (2007), page 541.
6 See Haenisch (2012), pages 2, 4 and 5.
7 See Haenisch (2012), pages 1 and 3. Bureaucrats were asked what 'they felt' would improve productivity.
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2.4 RESEARCH GAP AND CONTRIBUTION
It is evident that for those that have used economic growth determinants in order to empirically test the
relevance of Weberianess for an economy, few have focused on determinants that encompass both the
public and private sectors, not only private sector performance. Empirical studies on Weberianess and
economic growth determinants encapsulating 'both' the public and private sector productivities remains
scarce. Weber's scholarly thoughts were directed at enhancing public sector productivity, which would
then impact private sector productivity. Put simply, Weberianess was to enhance 'both' public and
private sector productivities, due to what Jordaan (2013) and Kousky & Kunreuther (2017) observed as
the inevitable interconnected roles of the public and private sectors. This is how Weber saw
bureaucracies as assuring public sector rationality (objectivity and efficiency) and being relevant for
economic activity. Therefore, a research gap lies in examining Weberianess against several
'productivity indicative' economic growth determinants, capturing both private and public sector
productivities, at cross country level. To test if the assumptions under the Weberian bureaucracy
argument hold today, the Weberian model should be explored against various productivity measures
that also 'directly capture' public sector productivity. Two questions can be further explored: Is
Weberianess relevant for several macroeconomic productivity measures that directly capture 'both'
public and private sector productivities? If yes, which Weberian principles are the most relevant?
This research contributes to macroeconomics and public administration literatures by attempting to
verify the 'relevance' of Weberianess today, for macroeconomic productivity. This study tried to
explore the importance of Weberian principles today using 'productivity indicative' macroeconomic
concepts of Total Factor Productivity (TFP) and Average Productivity (AP), which capture both public
and private sector productivity. On one end, TFP and AP directly capture labour productivity, which is
what Weberianess was to enhance in bureaucracies. On the other end, TFP and AP are both economic
growth determinants (Burda & Wyplosz, 2013) and thus offer a more direct causal relationship study
than looking at Weberianess against economic growth figures, for instance. Macroeconomic
productivity contributes to sustainable economic growth (Ibid). Given this, studying what links with
macroeconomic productivity is vital for national policy making. Literature on the empirical link
between measures like TFP and AP with Weberianess in bureaucracies remains scarce. Those who
have examined the link of such measures with Weberianess have focused on specific countries, than on
cross country data. Therefore, this study also offered a shift of focus to the under-explored link of
productivity measures like TFP with bureaucratic organisational structures, at cross country level.
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2.5 A SUMMARY OF THE LITERATURE REVIEW
Emanating from Weber's writings, the organisational theory of bureaucracy advocates that institutions
of public administration were to be well standardised and formalised in their work procedures in order
for them to have improved productivity. This enhances overall public-sector productivity and also
creates a conducive environment for the private sector to thrive. This further enhances macroeconomic
productivity, which makes economic growth sustainable in the long-run. This fits the Weberian model
into the general endogenous economic growth models. Despite Weber's model receiving a lot of
positivity, it has not gone without criticism, mainly due to diverging empirical findings at both
macroeconomic and microeconomic levels. However, scholars like Walton (2005) observed that 50%
of the differences noticed in empirical findings have been due to statistical shortcomings. This is
evidently seen in studies like that of Kurtz & Schrank (2007) where statistical measurements that did
not accurately capture Weberianess were used to suggest reverse causality of Weberianess and growth.
Literature on AP and TFP against Weberianess at macro economic level remains scarce. Yet, following
microeconomic (organisational) level studies like that of Haenisch (2012) who suggested that
bureaucracy be discarded if AP was to improve, there has been a mushrooming of hybrid state
institutions having Weberian ideals side-by-side with ideals of being more responsive. However, other
organisational level studies that measured 'actual' public sector productivity, like Da Cruz & Marques
(2011), found that municipal institutions closely resembling the Weberian model had higher TFP than
hybrid municipal institutions. Whether such correlations hold at cross country level for TFP and/or AP
has remained unexplored. This is the research gap that this study explored.
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CHAPTER 3
In this chapter is the research question, hypotheses and the operationalisation of concepts and
measurement. The operationalisation of concepts and measurement section highlights the empirical
setting, the different variables used and their data sources, the rationale behind the selection of
analytical methods and the regression model used for this study.
3.1 RESEARCH QUESTION
'To what extent is macroeconomic productivity empirically linked to Weberian public administration
structures today?'
3.2 HYPOTHESES
This study focused on bureaucratic closedness and bureaucratic professionalism, and macroeconomic
TFP and AP. For the hypotheses, considering the literature review, it was assumed that:
1. As per the Weberian model, bureaucracies with Weberian principles are more productive. 
2. Improved public sector productivity in turn improves private sector productivity, and this
equates to improvements in overall macroeconomic productivity.
It therefore follows that:
Null Hypothesis (H0): β̂1=0 …................................................. Eqn (1)
That is, no relationship exists (between how bureaucracies are structured with TFP and/or AP).
Alternative Hypothesis (HA): β̂1≠0  …................................................. Eqn (2)
That is, a relationship exists (between how bureaucracies are structured with  TFP and/or AP).
Following that two different dependent variables (DVs) will be explored against two independent
variables (IVs), there are four specific hypotheses to be tested if H
A
 holds:
H1: The greater the bureaucratic closedness, the greater a country's TFP, ceteris paribus.
H2: The greater the bureaucratic professionalism, the greater a country's TFP, ceteris paribus.
H3: The greater the bureaucratic closedness, the  greater the AP, ceteris paribus.
H4: The greater the bureaucratic professionalism, the greater the AP, ceteris paribus.
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The four hypotheses can be graphically summarised as:
Table 1: Expected Correlation Sign of the Relationship Between DVs and IVs
Variables Expected Correlation Sign
TFP & bureaucratic closedness +
TFP & bureaucratic professionalism +
AP & bureaucratic closedness +
AP & bureaucratic professionalism +
3.3 OPERATIONALISATION OF CONCEPTS & MEASUREMENT
3.3.1 Empirical Setting
This deductive research used the Large-N statistical analysis method. The scope of this study was not
limited to any specific type of country. The samples used included all countries with available data,
regardless of their level of income/ economic development. As Dahlström, Lapuente & Teorell (2010)
put it, Evans & Rauch only had 35 'developing' countries in their sample but it would be interesting to
examine if their findings also held for bureaucracies of advanced economies. The unit of analysis for
this paper was, therefore, 'countries'. Cross-sectional data analysis was used because time series data
analysis was not feasible, as the two main independent variable indices were available only as cross-
sectional data.8 Thus, the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression analysis method was employed.
OLS regression analysis appeared as the best available option since it is one of the widely used
methods of analysing linear regression models, according to Stock & Watson (2012: 149 & 156).
3.3.2 Data
Several datasets were used, namely: the 2018 QoG Standard dataset, the QoG Expert Survey II dataset,
and the World Bank (WB) dataset on GDP per person employed 1990-2017. The QoG Standard dataset
was used because it is a compilation of reliable data sources. Th e dataset is also an award-winning
dataset comprising many variables with large Ns (Quality of Government Institute, 2018). In addition,
the widely used QoG dataset had measurements for most of the variables needed for this paper, for the
period under observation -the year 2014. WB datasets are renowned datasets that have been used across
a range of studies and have some of their measurements incorporated in the QoG Standard dataset. To
capture data on AP, the QoG Standard dataset had to be used side-by-side with the WB dataset. The
QoG Expert Survey II dataset was used in a bid to increase the N for bureaucratic closedness.
8 The latest data on bureaucratic structure was the cross-sectional QoG Expert Survey II dataset for the year 2014 and it
was wave 5 of the QoG Expert Survey. Individual level data was also available, but it was not used in this research.
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3.3.3 Dependent Variables
Since this study focused on macroeconomic level productivity, the two dependent variables (DVs) used
were TFP at current purchasing power parity -PPP (USA=1) and GDP per person employed
(representing AP), for the year 2014. Two DVs were used in order to repeat the macroeconomic
productivity measurement using a different variable and check the stability of the results. The first DV,
TFP at current PPP (USA=1), was originally from the Penn World Trade (PWT) dataset by Feenstra et
al (2015) and was sourced from the 2018 QoG Standard dataset (Teorell et al , 2018: 494 & 489).
According to PWT (2018), this variable indicated a country's level of TFP at constant PPP that was
relative to USA prices in that period. Higher values of this variable indicated higher TFP.9 TFP is a
hard concept to measure (Danquah, Moral-Benito & Ouattara, 2011) because it reflects joint effects of
both micro and macro level factors -including economies of scale, better technology, research and
development, production organisational changes and managerial skills (Khan, 2006).10 However,
looking at current data sources, this variable provided reliable estimates of TPF at cross-country level.
The second DV, GDP per person employed, was from the World Bank (WB) ILOSTAT database (The
World Bank Group, 2018). It captured GDP divided by the total employment for an economy, and thus
represented labour productivity (Ibid). It indicated the level of output for every worker (OECD, 2018b;
The World Bank Group, 2018) . Higher values of this variable indicated higher GDP per person
employed. Currently, a measurement that best estimates AP at cross country level, having a large N,
remains as GDP per person employed.11 12 However, the methodology for capturing the GDP per
person employed sometimes differs among countries, due to things such as differences in the
definitions of what makes up the informal sector (Ibid).
3.3.4 Main Independent Variables
The main independent variables were the Closedness Index and the Professionalism Index, for the year
2014.13 Their original source was the Dahlström et al (2015) QoG data. The first index, the Closedness
9 Information on this variable's exact scale was not available.
10 Weberian principles fit into the components of 'production organisational changes' and 'managerial skills'.
11 Other measures such as GDP per hour exist, but the N was very low. However, the variable was still tested as a DV.
12 GDP per capita can also be referred to as AP. However, GDP per capita does not exactly capture how productive each
worker is. GDP per capita only shows how productive one economy is, overall, as compared to another economy, while
factoring in the population size. It captures the income of 'each person' in an economy. Increases in annual GDP per
capita can be influenced by an increase in the annual population death rate (Brenner, 2005), even if the overall GDP and
available labour force have remained relatively the same, causing no change in labour productivity (AP) levels.
13 A third measure, 'bureaucratic impartiality', which measured how impartial bureaucratic institutions were, was left out
because it may be highly correlated with bureaucratic professionalism, according to Suzuki & Demircioglu (2017: 11). I
also found that the two variables almost reached the threshold for highly correlated variables (see Appendix 7).
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Index, measured the extent to which public administrations were closed or public-like, as compared to
being open or private-like (Holmberg & Rothstein, 2012:62; Dahlberg et al, 2017). The specific
components of this index were three, namely: 1) Formal examination system; 2) Lifelong careers; and
3) 'Special employment laws' for public administration operations that were not applicable in the
private sector (Dahlström, Lapuente & Teorell, 2010). The index ran on a scale of 1 to 7, were 1
represented a perfectly open system and 7 represented a perfectly closed system (Ibid). Higher values
of the index meant that a public administration was more closed (Dahlberg et al, 2017). Unfortunately,
out of the original sample of 47 countries, no African country was part of the index, making it tricky to
make generalisations to certain regions like Sub-Saharan Africa. The index also had only one South
American nation (Guyana) and only three Asian countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan). To
increase the N, the different components of this Index were explored using the QoG Expert Survey II
dataset. For this research, the questions that represented these components were shortened as q2_d
(Formal examination), q2_j (Long term careers), and q4_f (Special law for terms of employment).14
The second index, the Professionalism Index, measured the extent to which public administrations were
professional, as compared to being politicised (Holmberg & Rothstein, 2012:62). The specific
components of this index were four: 1) Meritocratic recruitment; 2) Existence of political recruitments;
3) Whether political elites recruited senior officials; and 4) Whether senior officials were internally
recruited (Dahlström, Lapuente & Teorell, 2010).15 The index ran on a scale of 1 to 7, were 1
represented a completely unprofessionalised system and 7 represented a perfectly professionalised
system (Ibid). Higher values of the index meant that a public administration was more professionalised
(Dahlberg et al, 2017). This index had a larger sample size as compared to the Closedness Index, with
its original N being 112 countries, spread across all continents.
According to Dahlström, Lapuente & Teorell (2010), these measures of the dimensions of bureaucracy
are the largest cross-national measurements on public administration structures.16 The indices were
maintained as separate variables. As shown in Figure 2, countries like Ireland had high closedness at
5.55 and high professionalism at 6.16, when a country like Greece, while having a similarly high level
14 See Dahlström et al (2015) pages 9-10, for more details on how each question was phrased.
15 According to Dahlström, Lapuente & Teorell (2010), the Closedness and Professionalism Indices together measure the
original Evans & Rauch (1999) Weberianess Scale well. However, the two indices do not address the part of 'rewards',
which appears as a significant component in the original Evans & Rauch 1999 Weberianess Scale.
16 Other measurements of the quality/ efficiency of bureaucratic structures exist, such as the CPIA quality of public
administration ratings. These measurements, however, could not concretely answer the research question posed in this
paper. A country rating does not specify which bureaucratic dimension matters the most/ least for economic outcomes.
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of closedness at 5.66, had a much lower level of professionalism at 3.92 (i.e. Greece was more
politicised). Also, New Zealand had high professionalism at 6.19 but low closedness at 3.07 (i.e. was
more open) as compared to Ireland which was more closed, despite having a similarly high level of
professionalism. This was consistent with the observations made by Dahlström, Lapuente & Teorell
(2010), suggesting that the two dimensions are distinctively independent Weberian characteristics
(Ibid). The multidimensional nature of Weberian bureaucracy could even be superior to looking at
Weberian principles from a unidimensional perspective (Reimann, 1973).
Figure 2: The Professionalism Index by the Closedness Index – 2014
Data Source: 2018 QoG Standard Dataset. 
N= 46 countries (Guyana, the 47th country in the Closedness Index is excluded).
3.3.5 Control Variables
The control variables (CVs) that were used for AP were two, namely: 1) The Human Capital Index
(HCI); and 2) The Heterogeneity Index. For TFP, in studies like that of Danquah, Moral-Benito &
Ouattara (2011:21-22), after looking at datasets for 67 countries from 1960 to 2000, the factors that
empirically proved to be the most robust in determining TFP were initial GDP levels, the share of
consumption, trade openness and unobserved heterogeneity. Therefore, for TFP, four CVs were used,
namely: 1) Real GDP; 2) General Government Final Consumption Expenditure; 3) Trade freedom; and
4) The Heterogeneity Index. AP and TFP are different concepts that could not have the exact same CVs.
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For the first CV for TFP, the variable that was used was the PWT 2014 Real GDP at constant 2011
national prices (in millions of 2011 US dollar) from the 2018 QoG Standard dataset (Teorell et al,
2018: 492-493).17 Higher values were associated with higher Real GDP levels. According to Danquah,
Moral-Benito & Ouattara (2011), lower initial GDP is associated with higher productivity levels.
Therefore, for this research, hypothetically, the lower the Real GDP, the higher the TFP.
The second CV for TFP, General Government Final Consumption Expenditure, was also from the
QoG Standard dataset (Teorell et al, 2018: 605). The original data source was the UN 2017 Statistics
(Opcit: 602). Higher values of this variable were associated with higher levels of General Government
Final Consumption Expenditure. Government Consumption is a significant policy variable that
negatively affects TFP due to reliance on government spending (Boldrin et al, 2004:113). An economy
experiences increased consumption expenditure instead of increased investments. For this research,
hypothetically, the higher the General Government Final Consumption Expenditure, the lower the TFP.
For the third CV for TFP, no variable directly measured trade openness in the QoG dataset, so the
Trade Freedom variable was used instead, as the two are closely related concepts.18 Trade openness/
freedom accelerates productivity (Keho & Wang, 2017) as it promotes competition for domestic
producers and encourages innovation, while integrating an economy into the global market (Zidouemba
& Elitcha, 2018: 467). Therefore, hypothetically, the higher the trade freedom, the higher the TFP. The
trade freedom variable used in this paper was also from the 2018 QoG Standard dataset (Teorell et al,
2018: 349). Its original dataset was the Heritage Foundation 2017 dataset (Ibid: 345). It ranged from 0
to 100 – where 0 denoted the minimum degree of trade freedom and 100 denoted the maximum. The
trade freedom variable was based on the two inputs of Non-tariff barriers and a country's trade-
weighted average tariff rate (Op cit: 349). 
For the fourth CV for TFP, a Heterogeneity Index was created. Including variables that capture things
like language variations in a statistical model makes the model sufficient in accounting for unobserved
heterogeneity – i.e. unobserved institutional and cultural effects (Fisher, 2010: 1). To capture all the
areas of a country's heterogeneity, the index was created using the three measures of heterogeneity in
the 2018 QoG Standard dataset, with the original dataset being Alesina et al (2003) (Teorell et al, 2018:
17 To better represent 'initial' GDP, 2013 Real GDP could not be sourced as cross sectional data. Real GDP was picked
over GDP per capita measures as the latter showed high correlation with the DVs and this distorts regression results.
18 Other sources like the World Bank were checked but data on trade openness could not be found during the time of this
research. Data from the Federal Reserve Bank Penn World Table 7.1 had openness to trade in time series format.
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68). The three measures were: ethnic fractionalisation, religious fractionalisation and language
fractionalisation (Ibid). All variables ran on a scale of 0 to 1, where 1 indicated the maximum degree of
fractionalisation (Opcit). While language fractionalisation and religious fractionalisation captured only
language and race, respectively, ethnic fractionalisation was a combination of both race and language,
in order to capture people who spoke different languages but were of the same race (Teorell et al, 2018:
68). Further details on this index can be found under Appendix 5. It ran on a scale of 0 to 1 and higher
values were associated with higher heterogeneity. For this research, hypothetically, the higher the
Heterogeneity Index, the lower the TFP. High heterogeneity is usually associated with inducing inter-
group conflict, especially in the case of public goods control (Spolaore & Wacziarg, 2017), and this can
negatively impact productivity. The Heterogeneity Index was also used for AP. For this research,
hypothetically, the higher the Heterogeneity Index, the lower the AP. 
The second CV for AP, the Human Capital Index (HCI), was from the Penn World Trade (PWT)
dataset by Feenstra et al (2015) and was sourced from the 2018 QoG Standard dataset (Teorell et al,
2018: 490). Higher values of the HCI meant that a country had higher levels of human capital.19
Hypothetically, higher HCI figures were to be associated with higher AP values. Human capital is a set
of skills that have the tendency of increasing a worker’s productivity (Acemoglu, 2009), which
increases overall productivity (Goldin, 2014), making workers valuable assets (Dae-Bong, 2009).20 The
HCI was used because it captured both years spent schooling and returns to that education (PWT, nd:
1). The HCI better captures the concept of human capital accumulation.
A summary of descriptive statistics for all the variables used in the main models and test models for the
three components of bureaucratic closedness is presented under Appendix 4.
3.3.6 Test Variable
For TFP, a different measure of Consumption Expenditure - GDP Final Consumption Expenditure-
was tested as a CV. GDP Final Consumption Expenditure was also from the 2018 QoG Standard
dataset and its original data source was the UN 2017 Statistics (Opcit: Teorell et al, 2018: 603). Higher
values of this variable were associated with higher levels of GDP Final Consumption Expenditure. For
this research, hypothetically, the higher the GDP Final Consumption Expenditure, the lower the TFP.21
19 Information on the exact scale range was missing from both the 2018 QoG Standard dataset and original dataset website.
20 See also Doepke (1999) or Solow (1956).
21 General Government Final Consumption Expenditure was picked over this variable as it seemed to represent the share
of consumption that would have the most impact on my models, given that the main IVs were related to state structures.
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3.3.7 OLS Regression Model
Following the preceding discussion on the variables used for this research, assuming the expected value
of the error term is 0, the bivariate and multivariate regression for the sample explored was therefore:
ŷ= β̂0+ β̂1 x1 …................................................. Eqn 3 (a)
ŷ= β̂0+ β̂1 x1+ β̂2 z1+ β̂3 z2+ β̂4 z3 ..................... Eqn 3 (b)
Where:
I. Eqn  1 (a) is the bivariate regression model and Eqn 1 (b) is the  multivariate regression model.
II. ŷ  represents the 'DV'; the x  variable represents the 'main IV'; and the z  variables are 'CVs',
differentiated by the subscript value as different variables which can be increased or decreased
depending on a specific model.
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CHAPTER 4
This chapter presents the empirical results, discussion of the results and conclusion. The discussion also
highlights how endogeneity was limited, the research limitations and potential areas for further
research. The conclusion also includes a key policy recommendation, based on the research results.
4.1 RESULTS
4.1.1 Data Diagnostics
All data diagnostics are presented in Appendix 6. The assumptions of linearity between the two DVs
and the two main IVs were fulfilled as shown in Figures 3 to 6.
Figure 3: TFP and The Professionalism Index
Figure 4: TFP and The Closedness Index
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Figure 5: AP and The Professionalism Index          
Figure 6: AP and The Closedness Index                
The three components of the Closedness Index also showed linearity that suggested a positive
relationship with both AP and TFP, except q2_j (Long term careers) which suggested linearity that had
a negative relationship with AP and a less steep slope with TFP than other components. In addition, all
variables used seemed to have a somewhat normal distribution curve, except GDP per person employed
(AP) and Real GDP. GDP per person employed (AP) and Real GDP were therefore transformed into
logarithms (logs) in order to give them a somewhat normal distribution curve. Both variables were
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positive when being transformed, as required (Stock & Watson, 2012: 314), and what was used were
their natural logarithms, which represented x=ln (ex)  with its base as  e  (Ibid: 308). 
There also seemed to be no presence of extreme outliers which can increase Standard Errors (SEs) or
exaggerate the coefficients. For all models, the Cook's Distances were between 0 and 1. The highest
Cook's Distance being less than 1 indicated that those spots that were maximum Cook's distances were
cases that were not so influential against the regression line (Nieuwenhuis et al, 2012). Further,
homoskedasticity was checked because the presence of heteroskedasticity (an unequal scattering of a
variable) compromises efficiency. Consequently, the values of the expected residuals were plotted
against the actual residual values for the full models. The graphs suggested heteroskedasticity in all
cases and so Robust SEs were done and the models re-ran. However, no changes were noticed in the
full models. This suggested that the heteroskedasticty that was noticed was not influential.
For all other models, there seemed to be no/ little multicollinearity. All Variance Inflation Factor (VIF)
values scored between 1 and 3, and as noted by O’Brien (2007), the rule of thumb that is used in many
researches for the maximum acceptable value for the VIF is 10. The VIF statistics were between 1 and
3 even when all variables were made as the DV, as required in SPSS. What was reported, however,
were the VIF statistics for the full models. Further, a look at the variable correlations did not indicate
high multicollinearity because all the correlation scores were within acceptable ranges of less than 0.8.
Furthermore, all variables showed normal errors, even when all variables were made as the DV.
Normal errors for the DVs for the full models is presented in the data diagnostics Appendix 6.
For all models, a high cutting point for the p-values was employed. The minimum p-value was the
statistically acceptable value of p<.05 for the null hypothesis to be rejected (Park & Allaby, 2017) and
it was denoted with one asterisk, unlike in some other researches were such a p-value can be denoted
by two asterisks.
4.1.2 Regression Analysis
The following results were according to the original bureaucratic closedness and professionalism
indices in the 2018 QoG Standard dataset. Results according to the different components of
bureaucratic closedness on both TFP and AP (measured as GDP Per Person Employed) are found in
Appendix 2. Results according to the test CV on the TFP model are also found in Appendix 2.  
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Table 3: OLS Multivariate Regression of  Bureaucratic Closedness and Professionalism on TFP22
DV: TFP Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
Closedness
Index
.450
(.254)
.231
(.225)
.217
(.209)
.210
(.210)
.164
(.225)  –  –  –  –  –
Professionalism
Index
 –  –  –  –  – .598***(.138)
.493***
(.131)
.282**
(.116)
.248*
(.119)
.277*
(.116)
Real GDP (ln)  – .063***(.017)
.058***
(.015)
.057**
(.016)
.060**
(.016)  –
.044***
(.011)
.041***
(.009)
.042***
(.010)
.036***
(.009)
Trade Freedom  –  – .016*(.006)
.015*
(.006)
.015*
(.007)  –  –
.012***
(.002)
.011***
(.002)
.010***
(.002)
General 
Government 
Final 
Consumption 
Expenditure
 –  –  – .005(.007)
.004
(.008)  –  –  –
.005
(.004)
.002
(.004)
Heterogeneity 
Index  –  –  –  –
–.113
(.117)  –  –  –  –
 –.201*
(.093)
Constant .440*
(.164)
–.214
(.221)
–1.499*
(.523)
–1.482**
(.526)
–1.437*
(.619)
.312***
(.074)
–.17 9
(.141)
–.983***
(.182)
–1.026***
(.186)
–.726***
(.217)
R2 .07 6 .33 9 .44 8 .45 8 .46 5 .18 3 .31 4 .51 5 .52 3 .55 3
N 40 40 40 40 39 86 86 86 86 84
*p<.05 ** p<.01 ***p<.001. Standard errors within parentheses.
Data: Standard QoG dataset (2018), & The World Bank dataset on GDP per person employed 1990-2017
22 Countries were split according to income level, using World Bank GNI per capita levels from the 2018 QoG Standard
dataset, PPP at constant 2011 international dollars (Teorell et al, 2018: 644). High income and upper middle income
countries were categorised as 'high income' while lower middle income and low income were categorised as 'low
income'. See World Economic Situation and Prospects (2014: 144). For Closedness and TFP, the N for the low-income
group was only 2 countries. For Professionalism on TFP, the N for the low-income group was only 12 countries. For the
high income group, professionalism showed significance at p<.001 in its bivariate model (N=74) and p<.05 in the full
model (N=73). For the high income group, closedness showed insignificance in its bivariate model (with N=38) and in
the full model (with N=37). This is not reported because the Ns are close to the original models.
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Table 4: OLS Multivariate Regression of Bureaucratic Closedness and Professionalism on AP23 
DV: GDP Per Person Employed (ln) Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16
Closedness Index 1.240
(.844)
1.929*
(.850)
1.443
(.800)  –  –  –
Professionalism Index  –  –  – 2.970***(.617)
.987*
(.454)
1.049*
(.429)
HCI  – 3.719*(1.568)
4.578**
(1.479)  –
4.724***
(.433)
3.922***
(.447)
Heterogeneity Index  –  – –1.624**(.581)  –  –
–1.338***
(.327)
Constant 10.149***
(.546)
6.642***
(1.566)
6.789***
(1.444)
8.782***
(.350)
6.509***
(.300)
7.585***
(.026)
R2 0.05 2 .17 5 .32 2 0.19 1 .63 7 .69 7
N 41 41 40 100 100 97
 *p<.05 ** p<.01 ***p<.001. Standard errors within parentheses.
 Data: Standard QoG dataset (2018), & The World Bank dataset on GDP per person employed 1990-2017
23 Notes:
1. For Closedness and AP, the low-income group had only 2 countries. For Professionalism and AP, the low-income
group had only 20 countries. However, when the sample size was made to have only the high income group,
professionalism showed significance at p<.001 in its bivariate model (with N=80) and p<.01 in the full model (with
N=78). Closedness remained insignificant in its bivariate model (N=39) and in the full model (N=38)
2. A different measure of AP - GDP Per Hour Worked- was tested as DV. Bureaucratic closedness remained
insignificant while professionalism was significant at p<.001 in both its bivariate and full model. The models,
however, had N= 29 and thus showed high SEs. GDP Per Hour Worked was in USD (at constant 2010 prices and
PPPs) and was an index (OECD, 2018a). The variable had an original N of 39 and was from the 2018 QoG
Standard dataset. Its original source was the OECD 2017 dataset (Teorell et al, 2018: 468 & 453).
3. Initial AP was tested on both bureaucratic closedness and bureaucratic professionalism, using 2013 GDP per
person employed from the WB dataset. However, there was high multi-collinearity between this variable and the
main DV, with variable correlation statistics being at 1. The initial AP variable was seen to have reversed the signs
for both the HCI and Heterogeneity Index and made both variables insignificant. According to  Park & Allaby
(2017), this happens when there is high multicollinearity. However, the Closedness Index remained insignificant
while the Professionalism Index remained significant at p<.05.
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4.2 DISCUSSION
4.2.1 Interpretation of Results
4.2.1.1 TFP with Bureaucratic Closedness And Bureaucratic Professionalism
Under Table 3, for TFP and bureaucratic closedness, with a sample size of N= 40, bureaucratic
closedness was insignificant in models 1 to 4. With N= 39, after controlling for  heterogeneity, the
Closedness Index still remained insignificant in the full model 5. There was a reduction in the value of
the constant from the bivariate regression at .440 to -1.437 in the full model when CVs were added. In
all models, the R2 was greater than zero (R2 > 0) and increased when more variables were added to the
analysis. This is noticed with the move from 0.076 in model 1 to 0.465 in model 5, even if model 5 had
an N that was less by one country. Model 5 variables explained 46.5% (i.e. 0.465 *100) of the expected
variance in the change in TFP. For TFP and closedness, the N for the low-income group was only 2
countries, making between group analytical comparisons impossible. H1 (The greater the bureaucratic
closedness, the greater a country's TFP, ceteris paribus) had no empirical support. 
For TFP and bureaucratic professionalism, with N= 86, bureaucratic professionalism was significant in
models 6 to 9. The Professionalism Index was significant at a 99.9% level of confidence p<.0001 in its
bivariate model 6. In the bivariate model 6, the 0.598 value of the estimated coefficient of the
Professionalism variable suggested that a one unit increase (or decrease) in bureaucratic
professionalism would result in a 0.598 increase (or decrease) in the TFP at constant PPP (USA=1)
holding all other variables in the model constant. Higher values in bureaucratic professionalism
corresponded to higher values in TFP, and lower values in bureaucratic professionalism corresponded
to lower values  in TFP. In all five models (models 6 to 10), the R2 was greater than zero (R2 > 0) and
increased when more variables were added to the analysis. In model 6, bureaucratic professionalism
explained 18.3% (i.e. 0.183 *100) of the expected variance in the unit change of TFP. In the full model
10, factoring in all the CVs, the R2 increased to 0.553, suggesting that the variables now accounted for
55.3% of the variation in the unit change of TFP at constant PPP (USA=1). There was a reduction in
the value of the constant from the bivariate model at 0.312 to -0.726 in the full model 10 as more
variables were added to the analysis. 
Replacing the OLS regression model with the actual values in the full model 10, Eqn 3 (b) will then be:
T F P=−0.726+0.277 P r o f +0.036 R e a l G D P ( ln)+0.010T F+0.002C E−0.201 H I ….Eqn 4
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Where; Prof represents The Professionalism Index, TF represents the Trade Freedom variable, CE
represents the Consumption Expenditure variable, and HI represents the Heterogeneity Index.
In the full model 10, with N= 84, 0.726 is the value of TFP at constant PPP (USA=1), when all other
model variables are equal to 0. The 0.277 value of the estimated coefficient of the professionalism
variable suggested that a one unit increase in bureaucratic professionalism would result in a 0.277 unit
increase in TFP, at constant PPP (USA=1), holding all other variables in the model constant. Higher
values of the professionalism variable were associated with higher values of TFP. This result was in
line with H2 (The greater the bureaucratic professionalism, the greater a country's TFP, ceteris
paribus). The null hypothesis that no relationship exists between bureaucratic professionalism and TFP
(H0) was rejected, looking at the 95% level of confidence (p<.05) recorded for the Professionalism
Index in the full model. The alternative hypothesis (HA) was therefore accepted.
For the CVs, a one percent change in Real GDP would result in a 0.00036 change in TFP at constant
PPP (USA=1), holding all other variables in the model constant. That is, using the formula
β̂1∗ln (1.01/100) , which Stock & Watson (2012: 314) simply put as representing a 0.01 β̂1  change.
Higher values of the % change in the Real GDP variable were associated with higher values of a unit
change in TFP at constant PPP (USA=1), in contrast to what was expected. For the same model, a one
unit increase in Trade Freedom would result in a 0.010 unit increase in TFP, holding all other variables
in the model constant. Higher values of the Trade Freedom variable were associated with higher values
of TFP. Further, a one unit increase in the Heterogeneity Index would result in a 0.201 decrease in TFP,
holding all other variables in the model constant. Higher values of the the Heterogeneity Index variable
were associated with lower values of TFP, as expected. In the same manner, lower values of the the
Heterogeneity Index variable were associated with higher values of TFP.
For both the Closedness Index and Professionalism Index, the N for the low-income countries proved
to be too small in all cases to facilitate the capturing of between-group differences. For TFP and
closedness, the N for the low-income group was only 2 countries, making between group analytical
comparisons impossible. For TFP and professionalism, the N for the low-income group was only 12
countries, hindering between-group analytical comparisons. The N was too low to facilitate the
minimum widely acceptable sample size of N=30. However, professionalism maintained its
significance  with TFP in the high income group for both its bivariate (N=74) and full model (N=73).
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4.2.1.2 AP with Bureaucratic Closedness And Bureaucratic Professionalism
Under Table 4, for AP and bureaucratic closedness, with a sample size of N= 41, bureaucratic
closedness was insignificant in its bivariate model 11 but seemed to be significant with the probability
of the null hypothesis being true at 5% (p<.05) for model 12. In model 12, the 1.929 value of the
estimated coefficient of the Closedness Index suggested that a one unit change in bureaucratic
closedness would result in approximately 192.9% change in the GDP per person employed (AP),
holding other variables constant. That is, using the formula ( e β̂1−1 )* 100 , which Stock & Watson
(2012: 314) simply put as representing a 100 β̂1 % change. However, when the Heterogeneity Index
was added and the N dropped to 40, the Closedness Index again showed insignificance. The HCI had a
positive correlation at a 95% level of confidence (p<.05) and the Heterogeneity Index had a negative
correlation at a 99% level of confidence (p<.01). In all three models, the R2 was greater than zero (R2 >
0) and increased when more variables were added to the analysis. In model 13, the variables explained
32.2% of the variance in the percentage change in AP. There was a reduction in the value of the
constant from model 11 at 10.149 to 6.789 in model 13 as more variables were added to the analysis.
However, H3 (The greater the bureaucratic closedness, the greater a country's AP, ceteris paribus)
found no empirical support. 
For AP and bureaucratic professionalism, with N= 100, the Professionalism Index remained positively
correlated in all models (i.e. model 14 to 16). In the bivariate model 14, a one unit increase in
bureaucratic professionalism would result in approximately 297% change in the GDP per person
employed, holding all other variables in the model constant. The Professionalism Index seemed to be
significant at a 99.9% level of confidence (p<.0001). In model 15, when controlled for HCI, the
Professionalism Index maintained its significance but at a lower confidence level of 95% (p<.05). For
the full model 16, when all CVs were added and the N dropped to 97, the Professionalism Index
maintained its significance at a 95% level of confidence (p<.05). There was a reduction in the value of
the constant from model 14 at 8.782 to 7.585 in the full model 16 when all CVs were added. In all three
models, the R2 was greater than zero (R2 > 0) and increased when more variables were added. In model
14, bureaucratic professionalism explained 19.1% of the expected variance in the % change in GDP per
person employed (AP). In the full model 16, the model variables explained 69.7% of the expected
variance in the % change in GDP per person employed (AP). 
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Replacing the OLS regression model with the actual values in model 16, Eqn 3 (b) will then be:
A P (ln )=7.585+1.049 P r o f e s s i o na l i sm+3.922 H C I−1.338 Heterogeneity Index .....Eqn 5
In the full model 16, the value of 7.585 is the percentage value of GDP per person employed (AP),
when all other model variables are equal to 0. The 1.049 value of the estimated coefficient of the
professionalism variable suggested that a one unit increase in bureaucratic professionalism would result
in approximately 104.9% increase in the GDP per person employed (AP), holding all other variables in
the model constant. Higher values of the professionalism variable were associated with higher values of
the % change in AP. This result was in line with H4 (the greater the bureaucratic professionalism, the
greater the AP, ceteris paribus). The null hypothesis that no relationship exists between bureaucratic
professionalism and AP (H0) was rejected, looking at the 95% level of confidence (p<.05) recorded for
the Professionalism Index in the full model 16. The alternative hypothesis that a relationship exists
between bureaucratic professionalism and AP (H
A
) was therefore accepted.
For the CVs, in the full model, the HCI maintained a positive correlation at a 99.9% level of confidence
(p<.001) and the Heterogeneity Index had a negative correlation which was also at a 99.9% level of
confidence (p<.001). A unit increase in the HCI would result in a 1.049 percentage increase in the GDP
per person employed (AP), holding all other variables in the model constant. Higher values of the HCI
variable were associated with higher values of the percentage change in GDP per person employed
(AP). For the same model, a unit increase in the Heterogeneity Index would result in a 3.922
percentage decrease in the GDP per person employed (AP), holding all other variables in the model
constant. Higher values of the Heterogeneity Index variable were associated with lower values of the
percentage change in  GDP per person employed (AP), as expected. In the same manner, lower values
of the the Heterogeneity Index variable were associated with higher values of the percentage change in
GDP per person employed (AP).
The N for the low-income countries proved to be too small in all cases to facilitate the capturing of
between-group differences. For AP and closedness, the N for the low-income group was only 2
countries. For AP and professionalism, the N for the low-income group was only 20 countries.
However, professionalism maintained its significance with AP in the high income group for both its
bivariate (with N=80) and full model (with N=78).
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4.2.1.3 Model Robustness Checks
Firstly, as mentioned, Robust SEs were ran for all full models and none of the results changed.
Secondly, to check if bureaucratic closedness would show different results when analysed in a way that
increased its N, regression analysis for its three different components was done. More specifically,
regressions were ran for q2_d (Formal examination), q2_j (Long term careers) and q4_f (Special law
for terms of employment). These regression results are shown under Appendix 2 as models 17 to 22.
However, even when the N reached as high as 101, 114 and 116, each of the closedness components
remained insignificant in their bivariate models, and there was no need to add any CVs to the models.
Thirdly, when another measure of consumption expenditure (GDP Final Consumption Expenditure)
was tested on the TFP model, closedness remained insignificant while professionalism remained
significant at p<.05. For bureaucratic professionalism, the test variable was insignificant, but for
bureaucratic closedness, the test variable was significant at p<.01 and showed a negative correlation, as
expected. The full models had Robust SEs done but no change was noticed. This test model is also
presented under Appendix 2, models 23 to 26. Fourthly, when only high income countries were
examined, professionalism remained significant and closedness remained insignificant.
4.2.1.4 A Summary of All Regression Results
The Professionalism Index was significant for both AP and TFP, and it maintained its significance even
when CVs where added to the different models one CV at a time. The Professionalism Index was
significant at a 95% level of confidence (p<.05) for both TFP and AP in their full models. A more
professional bureaucracy was positively correlated with both AP and TFP. The Closedness Index,
however, showed statistical insignificance for both AP and TFP, except in only one model.
Bureaucratic closedness, however, also showed statistical insignificance even when it was looked at
from its three different components of q2_d (Formal examination), q2_j (Long term careers), and q4_f
(Special law for terms of employment). In addition, when a different measure of consumption
expenditure was tested on the TFP models, bureaucratic closedness remained insignificant while
professionalism remained significant. Overall, H1 and H3 did not receive empirical support, but H2 and
H4 found empirical support. Unfortunately, the N for the low-income countries proved to be too small
in all cases to properly facilitate the capturing of between-group differences.
The empirical results for the four main hypotheses earlier discussed, can be graphically summarised as
shown in Table 5.
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Table 5: Expected Vs Actual Correlation Sign of the Relationship Between DVs and IVs
Variables Expected
Correlation
Sign
Actual
Correlation
Sign
TFP & bureaucratic closedness + 0
TFP & bureaucratic professionalism + +
AP (GDP per person employed) & bureaucratic closedness + 0
AP (GDP per person employed) & bureaucratic professionalism + +
4.2.1.5 Possible Implications of Regression Results
Results in this study suggest the relevance of Weberianess today, in contrast to studies like that of Lee
& Ki (2017). In accordance with other earlier studies like that of Dahlström, Lapuente & Teorell
(2011), these results indicate that some Weberian principles are more relevant for economic activity
than others. Regression results in this paper suggest that bureaucratic closedness might not be relevant
for macroeconomic productivity. However, bureaucratic professionalism seems to be relevant for
macroeconomic productivity. As per the literature review, bureaucracies with organisational structures
that practice high professionalism seem to have more productive economies. Bureaucratic
professionalism makes a conducive environment for efficient and effective communication, work
coordination, and policy planning and implementation.
This study's findings suggest that governments should cut out political recruitments in bureaucratic
structures, especially in senior positions, so that macroeconomic productivity is enhanced. Senior
officials should be internally recruited as opposed to being politically appointed. This probably acts as
motivation for the junior professional bureaucrats to be more productive in order to get noticed and
promoted. Furthermore, appointing a senior official from among the professionals means that the new
senior official is already well vested with the right organisational knowledge and they focus on
achieving long-term goals. This could imply less time for work orientation in the new role. Switching
from having highly politicised bureaucratic structures to highly professional bureaucratic structures
might be more beneficial for politicians than what they may assume. Bureaucratic professionalism
seems to be key in improving labour productivity, which in turn improves the output and quality of
goods and services in an economy. The latter is what citizens judge a politician's performance by
before casting their vote.
29
4.2.1.6 Dealing With Endogeneity
What makes parameter estimates uninterpretable is endogeneity, i.e. omitted variables,
multicollinearity, reverse causality, omitted selection or when the error term and explanatory variable
correlate (Antonakis et al, 2014). For this study, diagnostics were done and necessary adjustments
made. Specifically, an omitted variable bias (OVB) makes regression coefficients inconsistent (Stock &
Watson, 2007), resulting in an over or underestimating of one or more of the other model variable
effects. To try and address OVB, several CVs were employed, and the variables were added to the
analysis model one at a time to track changes in the effect sizes (R2). There will always be some OVB
but I did my best to address it by adding several CVs to my models. However, another way that
suggests that the case of OVB seemed unlikely is by looking at past research models. The models used
in this research were not far from other studies done on related variables. Further, to check if the model
included an irrelevant variable, standard errors (SEs) and significance levels were employed.
It would be inexact to conclude that the sample used was entirely unbiased as this study relied on all
available data and data on bureaucratic structures was skewed towards high income countries,
especially for the Closedness Index. Unbiasedness comes from a perfectly random sample (Stock &
Waltson, 2012). Yet, in such a study, random sampling could not be employed. All endogeneity can not
be solved, but I tried to minimise it. To try and make the sample more consistent, a larger N was
scouted for bureaucratic closedness by looking at each of the Closedness Index components. The law of
large numbers -where the sample ŷ  approaches the actual population y , making ŷ  more consistent
(Stock & Waltson, 2012: 109)- guided this research. Furthermore, to check for the stability of the
results, two DVs that differently measure macroeconomic productivity and had different data sources
were explored.
Furthermore, the possibility of reverse causality seemed highly unlikely, despite Kurtz & Schrank
(2007) claiming reverse causality of the Weberian-growth link, as they measured government
effectiveness and growth. How effective one thinks a particular country's bureaucracy is might be
largely influenced by levels of economic performance because effectiveness is usually tied to outcome.
In contrast, how professional or closed one perceives a particular country's bureaucracy to be is
disjointed from economic performance. Political elites not recruiting senior officials (i.e. a component
of professionalism), for instance, can be observed whether a country has high or low income.
Moreover, due to the insignificance of bureaucratic closedness, reverse causality seemed non-existent.
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4.2.1.7 Study Limitations
This research encountered some limitations. Firstly, the indices for the two main IVs were gathered
using expert opinions (Dahlberg et al, 2017). Thus, an unavoidable element of subjectiveness could not
be separated from the data. However, no other data sources provided more accurate measurements of
these indices (Dahlström, Lapuente & Teorell, 2010). Secondly, the full Closedness Index had a low N
and the entire data on bureaucratic structures was skewed towards high income countries, posing a
challenge for exploring between-group differences. For the former, the three different components for
the index were explored to capture a more widely representative sample. Thirdly, increases in TFP can
be due to technological progress, not only worker productivity. For this reason, two DVs were used, so
that this is double checked with actual estimates of labour productivity (AP). Fourthly, cross-sectional
data analysis only captures a point in time. Therefore, while this type of study helps to empirically test
the assumptions under the organisational theory of bureaucracy, it does not say what happens over
time. The other unfortunate part with using cross-sectional country level data was that sub-national
variations could not be captured, a concern also hinted by Charron, Dahlström & Lapuente (2016).
4.2.1.8 Future Research
For future research, datasets that capture bureaucratic structures should also focus on capturing data for
more low-income countries. Evans & Rauch's suggested positive correlation was found using data on
35 developing countries. Hence, researchers that want to explore the degree to which their study results
are still applicable today should use a dataset that has enough low-income countries to facilitate
between-group difference analysis. This means that, for instance, the latest waves of the QoG Expert
Survey should be available in both larger Ns that capture more of the lesser developed nations and as
time series data. The latter would facilitate the tracking of empirical changes over time. Also, despite
the private and public sectors having interconnected roles, it would also be interesting to empirically
test the data on public administration institutions' Weberianess with measures that capture only 'public
sector productivity', if such data could be 'reliably' compiled and made available at cross-country level.
As noted by Micheli et al (2005: 1), many public sector performance indicators that currently exist are
methodologically flawed and do not capture outputs or service quality. In addition, in the future,
perhaps investigating individual level data for Weberianess in the QoG datasets could suffice in
capturing within-country differences on Weberianess. This would be possible if future individual level
datasets have questions that focus on capturing organisational level data, the pool of respondents is
large for each individual country and the variations in answers are not due to high personal subjectivity.
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4.3 CONCLUSION
Following controversy over the relevance of Weberianess today, this study explored the idea that how
bureaucracies are structured has a bearing on productivity – using two productivity measures at
macroeconomic cross country level. Bureaucratic closedness showed statistical insignificance with the
two macroeconomic productivity measures of Average Productivity – AP (measured as GDP per
person employed) and Total Factor Productivity (TFP), for the year 2014. Bureaucratic closedness
maintained its insignificance when looked at both as a full index and through its three different
components, in order to increase its sample size. Bureaucratic professionalism, however, correlated
positively with both AP and TFP throughout the models used in this research. The null hypothesis that
no relationship exists was rejected for bureaucratic professionalism. This suggests that there are some
Weberian principles that still matter for economic activity today. More professional bureaucratic
structures are empirically linked with higher levels of macroeconomic AP and TFP. 
One policy recommendation is that governments should focus on ensuring low politicisation in
bureaucratic structures so that macroeconomic productivity is heightened, as this affects long-run
sustainable economic growth. Governments should adopt bureaucratic structures that hire professional
staff based on merit, while cutting out political recruitments - especially in positions of seniority in
bureaucracies. Senior officials should be internally recruited as opposed to being politically appointed.
The relevance of some Weberian principles, such as bureaucratic professionalism, should not be
ignored. In a world of limited resources, knowing what factors seem to be empirically linked with
macroeconomic productivity, which in turn influences long-run sustainable economic growth, is key
for properly directing government policy formulation, planning/ budgeting and execution, for both the
less developed and more developed countries.
In contrast to studies like that of Lee & Ki (2017), results in this study support the relevance of
Weberianess today. However, in accordance with other earlier studies like that of Dahlström, Lapuente
& Teorell (2011), these results indicate that some Weberian principles might be more relevant for
economic activity than others. Furthermore, the literature reviewed in this research supports Walton's
2005 findings. Some of the studies that have suggested the non-applicability of the Weberian model
have exhibited shortcomings in methodology. These shortcomings range from examining
measurements that do not accurately capture Weberianess to looking at the Weberian model from a
unidimensional nature but generally applying the findings. This makes the data on the relevance of
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Weberianess seem like it is surrounded by controversy, when it is infact surrounded by mere statistical
artifacts. An examination of bureaucratic organisational efficiency and/or effectiveness deviates from
examining Weberianess. Weberianess is 'the means to an end', the end being bureaucratic
organisational efficiency and/or effectiveness. 
Despite the data used in this research being based on expert 'opinions', the possibility of reverse
causality seemed highly unlikely, especially because bureaucratic closedness was statistically
insignificant. To try and address endogeneity, diagnostics were done and necessary adjustments made.
Several variable checks and larger Ns were explored so that the inferences could be more consistent
with reality. Further, the two macroeconomic productivity measures and the three components of the
Closedness Index offered a repetition of the 'Weberian-productivity' analysis with different sets of data,
in order to check the stability of the results. To accurately inform policy, considering the type of data
that was available for cross-country level analysis, seemingly fitting data analysis methods and models
were sort.
Results of this research can be generalised to both the less developed and more developed nations, but
with caution because this research did not go without limitations. The data on bureaucratic structures
was skewed towards high income countries. This also posed a challenge for exploring between-group
differences, according to country income level. Future research should look at ways of capturing data
that facilitates between-group difference analysis, and time series analysis. This study offered a shift of
focus to the under-explored link of Weberianess with macroeconomic productivity measures like TFP,
at cross-country level. Yet, as more comprehensive data on bureaucratic structures and productivity
measures at both macroeconomic and microeconomic level becomes available, more research should
be done. This would enhance our understanding of Weberian principles like bureaucratic
professionalism and the exact mechanism behind how they contribute to productivity.
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6.0 APPENDICES
6.1 APPENDIX 1: HOW TFP & AP EXACTLY LINK WITH ECONOMIC GROWTH
6.1.1 Economic Growth Stylised Facts Relating To TFP And AP
The economic growth stylised facts highlighted in this section accentuate how the macroeconomic
concepts of AP and TFP link with economic growth. To get proper insight on the variations in the pace
of sustainable economic growth among countries, one has to at least have information on inputs,
outputs and productivity (Inklaar & Timmer 2013: 2). Firstly, it is well known that an economy's
economic output is measured by the gross domestic product (GDP) at constant prices (Burda &
Wyplosz, 2013).24 As Gottfries (2013) and Burda & Wyplosz (2013) pointed out, this can be expressed
in simple terms as:
Y=F (K , L) …................................................. Eqn (6)
Where; Y = Economic output, K = Physical capital stock, and L = Labour.
In equation 4, GDP/economic output (Y) is a function of K and L. Changes in either K or L affect Y.
Among the many economic growth stylised facts, the first stylised fact that proved to be important for
this research was that pointed out by Comin (2006), Kouramoudou (2017), Yalçınkaya, Hüseyni &
Çelik (2017) and Jones & Tarp (2017) as:
'The large disparities in economic output are attributable more to total factor productivity (TFP),
than variations in the quantity of factors of production such as K or L.'
To clearly understand the above stylised fact, equation 3 has to be modified to include TFP, and so as
demonstrated by Adak (2009), the production function is then expressed as:
Y=A . F (K , L) …................................................. Eqn (7)
Where; Y = Economic output, K = Capital, L = Labour, and A = TFP.
The function (F) is now a product function so that changes in Y are influenced by changes in A, K and
L (Ibid; Adak, 2015). To support this stylised fact, many studies have also linked TFP with GDP and
economic growth. Jones & Tarp (2017), for instance, using cross country level data, found that TFP
24 The monetary value of economic output can, however, be measured in terms of GDP or Gross National Product (GNP).
Refer to Constanza et al (2009), page 3.
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levels accounted for up to approximately half of the level of increased GDP. In addition, Yalçınkaya,
Hüseyni & Çelik (2017) found that the TFP growth impact on overall economic growth was larger for
the more advanced economies than for emerging countries. TFP is thus a common determinant of an
economy's performance as it shows the“productivity based catching up capability” (Jajri, 2007: 41).
According to Burda & Wyplosz (2013), and Isaac (2017), Nicholas Kaldor also highlighted six notable
stylised facts about economic growth, after studying economic growth in 1961 across countries over
long time periods. Among these notable economic growth stylised facts (Isaac, 2017), the one that
merited note for this paper was that which Burda & Wyplosz (2013) highlighted as:
'Both capital intensity (K/L) and the average productivity (Y/L)
keep rising over time'.
GDP keeps growing without bound and K keeps growing, while L grows at a slower pace than K,
indicating a steady continuing rise in a country's standards of living - materially (Ibid). What thus sets
countries apart is the pace of this increase over time (Opcit). Consequently, one would ask: What
exactly affects this disparity in the average productivity? Among other things, is it how institutions -
such as public administration institutions - are organised, ceteris paribus?
Using the two highlighted stylised facts, it is apparent that TFP and Average Productivity (Economic
Output/Labour) are macroeconomic concepts linked to productivity, on one end, and economic growth,
on the other end. As Korkmaz & Korkmaz (2017) rightfully put it, productivity is a concept that has its
focus on economics of the firm. Scholars like Max Weber focused their theories on how to make
bureaucratic professionals more productive (i.e. firm level productivity), and thus had the
organisational theory of bureaucracy having its principles imbedded in the economics of the firm.
Economics of the firm refers to how an organisational entity (firm) arranges its resources, which
includes both physical capital and human capital (Demsetz, 1988:144; Coase, 1937). This organising of
human capital, in particular, is what the organisational theory of bureaucracy looks at. 
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6.2 APPENDIX 2: TEST MODELS25
6.2.1 Results According To Each Component of the Closedness Index
Table 6: OLS Multivariate Regression of Components of the Closedness Index on AP26
DV: GDP Per Person Employed (ln) Model 17
(bivariate)
Model 18
(bivariate)
Model 19
(bivariate)
q2_d (Formal examination) .066
(.077)  –  –
q2_j (Long term careers)  –  –.061(.089)  –
q4_f (Special law for terms of employment)  –  – .034(.106)
Constant 10.005***
(.346)
10.482***
(.435)
10.026***
(.589)
R2 .00 7 .00 4 .00 1
N 101 116 114
*p<.05 ** p<.01 ***p<.001. Standard errors within parentheses.
Data: Standard QoG dataset (2018), the World Bank dataset on GDP per person employed 1990-2017 & the
2015 QoG Expert Survey II dataset
25 Suffice to mention that I also tried to arrange the data in the QoG Expert Survey II dataset as according to the original
broad components mentioned by Max Weber, i.e. meritocratic hiring, predictable long-term careers, competitive salaries
and rule based authority but the Cronbach Alphas' were below the satisfactory levels for most of the categories and this
methodological approach had to be discarded.
26 Notes for the regression:
1. The N for q2_d is less by 13 countries, as the full dataset for this question had an N of 114 when regressed with
AP, and it showed significance at a p<.05 level. However, when the first control variable, HCI, was added to this
model, the N dropped to 101 and q2_d became insignificant, and remained insignificant when all other CVs were
added to the model. Other variables showed significance. Due to this, the data was then filtered from the beginning
in order to get a constant N at 101, thus the noticed 101 in the Table 6 bivariate model. Since the bivariate model
with N=101 later on showed insignificance, there was no longer a need to add any CVs to the model.
2. For the high income group, q2_d (Formal examination), q2_j (Long term careers) and q4_f (Special law for terms
of employment) were all insignificant in their bivariate models with N= 89, N=90 and N=89, respectively. The Ns
for the low income group were again too low to capture any meaningful regression results for comprehensive
between group comparisons, with the highest N being at 24.
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Table 7: OLS Multivariate Regression of Components of the Closedness Index on TFP27
DV: TFP Model 20
(bivariate)
Model 21
(bivariate)
Model 22
(bivariate)
 q2_d (Formal examination) .015
(.017)  –  –
q2_j (Long term careers)  –  –.007(.021)  –
q4_f (Special law for terms of employment)  –  –  –.041(.027)
Constant .569***
(.079)
.662***
(.103)
.854***
(.155)
R2 .00 9 .00 1 .02 4
N 88 91 91
         *p<.05 ** p<.01 ***p<.001. Standard errors within parentheses.
          Data: Standard QoG dataset (2018) & the 2015 QoG Expert Survey II dataset
27 Notes:
1. There was no need to add other variables to the models because each component was already insignificant in the
bivariate models.
2. For the high income group, q2_d (Formal examination), q2_j (Long term careers) and q4_f (Special law for terms
of employment) were all insignificant in their bivariate models with N= 73, N=75 and N=75, respectively. The Ns
for the low income group were too low to capture any meaningful regression results that facilitated between group
comparisons.
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6.2.2 TFP Results Using A Different Consumption Expenditure Measurement
Table 8: OLS Multivariate Regression of  Bureaucratic Closedness and Professionalism on TFP28
DV: TFP Model 23 Model 24 Model 25 Model 26
Closedness Index .260
(.179)
.22 4
(.192)  –  –
Professionalism Index  –  – .262*(.123)
.274*
(.118)
Real GDP (ln) .041**
(.041)
.044**
(.015)
.033**
(.010)
.033**
(.010)
Trade Freedom .003
(.006)
.003
(.007)
.010***
(.002)
.010***
(.002)
GDP Final Consumption 
Expenditure
–.008**
(.002)
–.008**
(.002)
 –.001
(.002)
 –.001
(.002)
Heterogeneity Index  – –.080(.143)  –
 –.212*
(.092)
Constant .469
(.690)
.440
(.739)
–.844*
(.321)
–.546
(.330)
R2 .60 6 .61 1 .51 7 .55 3
N 40 39 86 84
*p<.05 ** p<.01 ***p<.001. Standard errors within parentheses.
Data: Standard QoG dataset (2018), & The World Bank dataset on GDP per person employed 1990-2017
28 For bureaucratic closedness and AP, the N for the low-income group was only 2 countries. For bureaucratic
professionalism on AP, the N for the low-income group was only 12 countries. Yet, for the high income group,
professionalism showed significance at p<.05 in the full model (N=73).
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6.3 APPENDIX 3: LIST OF COUNTRIES USED
6.3.1 Countries Used in the Main Models (1 to 16) - According To Continent
No Country Continent Country Continent Country Continent
1. Benin Africa Pakistan Asia Poland Europe
2. Botswana Africa Philippines Asia Portugal Europe
3. Cote d'Ivoire Africa Singapore Asia Romania Europe
4. Cameroon Africa Thailand Asia Russia Europe
5. Algeria Africa Tajikistan Asia Serbia Europe
6. Egypt Africa Vietnam Asia Slovakia Europe
7. Ethiopia Africa Australia Australia Slovenia Europe
8. Ghana Africa Albania Europe Sweden Europe
9. Kenya Africa Austria Europe Ukraine Europe
10. Morocco Africa Belgium Europe Armenia Middle East
11. Madagascar Africa Bulgaria Europe Iraq Middle East
12. Mozambique Africa Switzerland Europe Israel Middle East
13. Mauritius Africa Cyprus Europe Turkey Middle East
14. Malawi Africa Germany Europe Barbados N. America
15. Namibia Africa Czech Republic Europe Canada N. America
16. Nigeria Africa Denmark Europe Costa Rica N. America
17. Rwanda Africa Spain Europe Guatemala N. America
18. Senegal Africa Estonia Europe Jamaica N. America
19. Togo Africa Finland Europe Mexico N. America
20. Tanzania Africa France Europe Nicaragua N. America
21. Uganda Africa Greece Europe El Salvador N. America
22. South Africa Africa United Kingdom Europe United States N. America
23. Zimbabwe Africa Croatia Europe Fiji Oceania
24. Bangladesh Asia Hungary Europe New Zealand Oceania
25. China Asia Ireland Europe Argentina S. America
26. Indonesia Asia Iceland Europe Bolivia S. America
27. India Asia Italy Europe Brazil S. America
28. Japan Asia Lithuania Europe Chile S. America
29. Kazakhstan Asia Latvia Europe Colombia S. America
30. Kyrgyzstan Asia Moldova Europe Ecuador S. America
31. Cambodia Asia Malta Europe Peru S. America
32. Korea, South Asia Netherlands Europe Uruguay S. America
33. Sri Lanka Asia Norway Europe Venezuela S. America
34. Nepal Asia
Total N= 100
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6.3.2 Additional Countries Included In The Sample For Checking The
Bureaucratic Closedness Index Components (Models 17 to 22)
No Country Name Continent
1. Eritrea Africa
2. Guinea Africa
3. Somalia Africa
4. South Sudan Africa
5. Afghanistan Asia
6. Hong Kong Asia
7. Malaysia Asia
8. Bosnia and Herzegovina Europe
9. Macedonia Europe
10. Montenegro Europe
11. Georgia Europe
12. Azerbaijan Middle East
13. Jordan Middle East
14. Lebanon Middle East
15. Dominican Republic North America
16. Guyana South America
Total additional N = 16
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6.4 APPENDIX 4: DATA MANIPULATIONS AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
6.4.1 Scale Manipulations
No Variable Original Scale Scale Used For Analysis
1. GDP Per Person 
Employed 
Higher values indicated
higher GDP per Person
Employed
 –
Comment: Variable was logged
2. TFP Higher values indicated
higher TFP
0 to 1
3. Closedness Index 1 to 7 0 to 1
4. Professionalism Index 1 to 7 0 to 1
5. Real GDP Higher values indicated
higher Real GDP
 –
Comment: Variable was logged
6. HCI Probably 0 to 2, higher
values indicated higher
HCI
0 to 1
7. Heterogeneity Index - 0 to 1
8. Trade Freedom 0 to 100 0 to 100
9. General Government 
Final Consumption 
Expenditure
Higher values indicated
higher General
Government Final
Consumption
Expenditure
Original scale maintained
No scale manipulations were done for the three components of the Closedness Index in test models 17
to 22.
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6.4.2 Descriptive Statistics For Main Model Variables (Models 1-16)
Variable N Scale Min. Max. Mean Std.
Deviation
GDP Per Person Employed (ln) 100  – 7.91 11.88 10.25 3 1.05 9
TFP 86 0 to 1 0 1 0.62 .22 4
Closedness Index 41 0 to 1 0.39 0.88 .635 0 .125 4
Professionalism Index 100 0 to 1 0.17 0.87 .495 3 .155 9
Real GDP (ln) 86  – 8.11 16.66 12.27 0 1.86 6
HCI 100 0 to 1 .3 0 .9 0 .68 9 .16 3
Heterogeneity Index 97 0 to 1 0.7 .8 4 0.4 .20 5
Trade Freedom 86 0 to 100 54.2 0 90 80.06 7 8.92 2
General Government Final 
Consumption Expenditure
86  – 6.46 26.2 0 17.08 3 4.44 1
6.4.3 Descriptive Statistics For Test Model Variables (Models 17-22)
Variable N Scale Min. Max. Mean Median Std.
Deviation
GDP Per Person Employed (ln) 116  – 7.66 11.88 10.19 3  – 1.07 9
TFP 91 0 to 1 0 1 0.63 – .23 1
q2_d (Formal examination) 101 1 to 7 1 7 4.3 0  – 1.35 1
q2_j (Long term careers) 116 1 to 7 2 7 4.7 6  – 1.13 5
q4_f (Special law for terms of 
employment)
114 1 to 7 1 7 5.4 9 6 .95 6
Note: q4_f (Special law for terms of employment) had data that seemed to be somewhat skewed to the 
left, and so its median has also been reported.
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6.4.4 Graphical Descriptive Statistics For Key Variables
TFP 
(when N= 86)
AP/ GDP Per Person Employed (ln)
(when N= 100 & after being logged)
Closedness Index 
(when N= 41)
Professionalism Index 
(when N= 100)
For the histograms above, the highest Ns were picked using models 1 to 16.
51
6.5 APPENDIX 5: THE HETEROGENEITY INDEX
The countries that made up the index were only those that were used for the analysis, after controlling
for all CVs. Testing the degree of reliability of the mix of variables, the Cronbach's Alpha score was at
0.723 for the 97 countries used in preparing the index, as shown in the following data outputs:29
29 According to  Loewenthal, K. M. (2004), a Cronbach's Alpha of 0.6 would still be an acceptable score. However, the
Cronbach's Alpha score that the data had was above what Nunnally (1978: 458) noted as the generally accepted
minimum of 0.7.
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6.6 APPENDIX 6: DATA DIAGNOSTICS
6.6.1 OLS Assumptions Check For Models 1 to 1630
6.6.1.1 TFP and The Closedness Index (Model 5)
Figure 7: Variable Correlations
 
Figure 8: Minimum and Maximum Cook's Distance              Figure 9: VIF Statistics
Figure 10: Homoskedasticity Check Figure 11: Normal Errors 
30 The study assumed the OLS multivariate regression assumptions of: 1) A linear relationship exists; 2) The mean of
residuals is zero; 3) No auto-correlation of residuals; 4) Residual homoskedasticity; 5) No presence of extreme outliers;
and 6) No or little multicollinearity (Bryman & Cramer, 2011; Stock & Watson, 2012: 164-168).
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6.6.1.2 TFP and The Professionalism Index (Model 10)
Figure 12: Variable Correlations
Figure 13: Minimum and Maximum Cook's Distance Figure 14: VIF Statistics
Figure 15: Homoskedasticity Check                                  Figure 16: Normal Errors
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6.6.1.3 AP and The Closedness Index (Model 13)
Figure 17: Variable Correlations 
Figure 18: Minimum and Maximum Cook's Distance Figure 19: VIF Statistics
Figure 20: Homoskedasticity Check Figure 21: Normal Errors 
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6.6.1.4 AP and The  Professionalism Index (Model 16)
Figure 22: Variable Correlations 
Figure 23: Minimum and Maximum Cook's Distance Figure 24: VIF Statistics
Figure 25: Homoskedasticity Check  Figure 26: Normal Errors
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6.6.2 OLS Assumptions Check For 'Test' Models 17 to 22
A Linear Relationship Exists
The assumption was fulfilled for all three components.
VIF Statistic(s)
All three components of the Closedness Index were checked for VIF statistics and they all equalled
1.00.
No Presence Of Extreme Outliers
The minimum and maximum Cook's distances all fell between 0 and 1 for all three components. 
Variable Correlations
The variable correlations were low for both AP and TFP with the three different components of the
Closedness Index. All variable correlations were below 0.8. The highest variable correlation was at
0.064.
Homoskedasticity Check
All the three components were checked for homoskedasticity and heteroskedastcity seemed present.
Robust SEs were done for all three variables but no changes were noticed in the full model. This
suggested that the heteroskedasticty that was noticed was not influential.
Normal Errors
All the three components showed normal errors for both AP and TFP.
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6.6.3 Additional References Used For Data Diagnostics
(1) Bryman, A. & Cramer, D. (2011). “Quantitative Data Analysis with IBM SPSS 17, 18 & 19; A 
Guide for Social Scientists”. Routledge. USA and Canada.
(2) Loewenthal, K. M. (2004). “An Introduction To Psychological Tests And Scales.” 2nd Edition. 
Hove, UK. Psychology Press.
(3) Nunnally, J. C. (1978). “Psychometric Theory.” 2nd Edition. New York. McGraw-Hill.
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6.7 APPENDIX 7: THE PROFESSIONALISM INDEX AND THE IMPARTIALITY
INDEX
The variable correlation results for bureaucratic professionalism and bureaucratic impartiality were as
shown below.
Bureaucratic professionalism and bureaucratic impartiality seem to be variables that fluctuate together.
A correlation of .78 6 is very close to the 0.8 mark which is considered as high correlation. However, it
is still less than the 0.8 threshold.
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